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Abstract 
Mechanism Design-Based Leader Election Scheme for Intrusion Detection 
in M A N E T 
Noman Mohammed 
We study the leader election in the presence of selfish nodes for intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). To balance the resource consumption among 
all nodes and prolong the lifetime of a MANET, nodes with the most remaining resources 
should be elected as the leaders. However, without incentives for serving others, a node 
may behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resource and avoiding being elected. 
We present a solution based on mechanism design theory. More specifically, we design a 
scheme for electing cluster leaders that have the following two advantages: First, the col-
lection of elected leaders is the optimal in the sense that the overall resource consumption 
will be balanced among all nodes in the network overtime. Second, the scheme provides the 
leaders with incentives in the form of reputation so that nodes are encouraged to honestly 
participate in the election process. The design of such incentives is based on the Vickrey, 
Clarke, and Groves (VCG) model by which truth-telling is the dominant strategy for each 
node. Simulation results show that our scheme can effectively prolong the overall lifetime 
of IDS in MANET and balance the resource consumptions among all the nodes. 
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A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring network in which each node acts 
as both a receiving node and a relaying node that transmits packets to other nodes within its 
transmission range. Unlike other networks, MANET is distributive in nature and therefore 
it lacks fixed centralized infrastructure. In MANET, decision-making, key-distribution and 
routing are usually decentralized and many of them depend on the cooperative participation 
of all nodes [72]. Besides, the topology of the network is always changing since nodes are 
constantly moving in and out of the network. In addition, these nodes have limited battery 
power and bandwidth along with computationally limited hardware. 
Applications of MANET are diverse [7]. For example the auto configuration capability 
of MANETs may be useful at war since missions are likely to take place in remote areas 
where network infrastructures are not available. Furthermore, MANETs are relevant in 
situations where wired communications have been destroyed or traditional networks are 
congested, such as in a rescue mission after a natural disaster. MANETs could also be used 
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in remote regions where telecommunications are scarce or there is no internet infrastruc-
ture. Finally, laptops, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), cell phones and other devices 
can also form MANETs for daily uses. 
1.1 Motivation 
MANET is particularly susceptible to many attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to 
active interfering due to its unique characteristics. The encryption techniques and firewalls 
are known to be insufficient for securing MANET against all kinds of attacks. Hence 
an intrusion detection system (IDS) is needed as a second line of defense for detecting 
intrusions and consequently triggering an appropriate response. Intrusion detection is the 
process of monitoring the system or network by looking into the occurring events and 
searching for intrusions. According to the type of data sources, IDS is typically categorized 
as host-based (HIDS) and network-based (NIDS). The former aims to detect intrusions 
targeting the system by analyzing system audit data, whereas the latter detects intrusions in 
the network by examining transmitted packets. The IDS techniques for wired infrastructure 
network which have been developed over the years cannot be directly applied to MANET 
due to some major differences between the two networks. The unique characteristics of 
MANET such as mobility and open wireless medium make IDS deployment harder. Unlike 
traditional networks, the MANET have no fixed chokepoints/botflenecks where IDS can be 
deployed [7,12]. Hence, a node may need to run its own IDS [3,33] and cooperate with 
others to ensure security [36,62]. This is very inefficient in terms of resource consumption 
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since mobile nodes are energy-limited. 
To overcome this problem, a common approach is to divide the MANET into a set of 
one-hop clusters where each node belongs to at least one cluster. The nodes in each cluster 
elect a leader node (cluster head) to serve as the IDS for the entire cluster. The leader-IDS 
election process can be either random [39] or based on the connectivity [45]. Both ap-
proaches aim to reduce the overall resource consumption of IDSs in the network. However, 
we notice that nodes usually have different remaining resources at any given time, which 
should be taken into account by an election scheme. Unfortunately, with the random model, 
each node is equally likely to be elected regardless of its remaining resources. The connec-
tivity index-based approach elects a node with a high degree of connectivity even though 
the node may have little resources left. With both election schemes, some nodes will die 
faster than others, leading to a loss in connectivity and potentially the partition of network. 
Although it is clearly desirable to balance the resource consumption of IDSs among nodes, 
this objective is difficult to achieve since the resource level is the private information of 
a node. Unless sufficient incentives are provided, nodes might misbehave by acting self-
ishly and lying about their resources level to not consume their resources for serving others 
while receiving others services. Misbehaving nodes shall deviate from telling the truth 
about their resources if that could maximize their own benefits. Moreover, even when all 
nodes can truthfully reveal their resources level, it remains a challenging issue to elect an 
optimal collection of leaders to balance the overall resource consumption without flooding 
the network. This motivated us to work on developing a leader election mechanism which 
will balance the resources among nodes, taking into consideration selfishness. 
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1.2 Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis, we propose a solution for balancing the resource consumption of IDSs among 
all nodes while preventing nodes from behaving selfishly. To develop our leader election: 
• We propose a cost of analysis function to protect nodes' sensitive information (re-
sources level) and ensure the contribution of every node on the election process. 
• We design incentives in the form of reputation to encourage nodes to honestly par-
ticipate in the election scheme. To motivate nodes in behaving normally in every 
election round, we relate the amount of detection service that each node is entitled to 
the nodes' reputation value. Besides, this reputation value can also be used to give 
priority in packet forwarding and to build a trust environment. 
• We calculate the payment (reputation) based on a classical mechanism design model, 
namely, Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) [55]. The model guarantees that truth-
telling is always the dominant strategy for every node during each election phase. 
• We devised a leader election algorithm to elect the globally optimal cost-efficient 
leaders, taking into consideration the possibility of cheating and security flaws. The 
algorithm decreases the percentage of leaders, single node clusters, maximum cluster 
size and increases average cluster size. 
• We address these issues in two possible settings, namely, Cluster Independent Leader 
Election (CILE) and Cluster Dependent Leader Election (CDLE). In the former, the 
leaders are elected according to the received votes from the neighbor nodes. The 
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latter scheme elects leaders after the network is formulated into multiple clusters. In 
both schemes, the leaders are elected in an optimal way in the sense that the resource 
consumption for serving as IDSs will be balanced among all nodes overtime. 
• Finally, we justify the correctness of proposed methods through analysis and simu-
lation. Empirical results indicate that our scheme can effectively improve the overall 
lifetime of a MANET. 
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we identify the 
important issue of balancing resource consumption of IDSs among nodes, and we provide 
a solution to this issue through the design and analysis of a new election scheme. Second, 
we study the threat of selfish nodes to leader election, and we provide a solution by adapting 
a mechanism design model named VCG. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
In chapter 2, we discuss several attacks to demonstrate the need for IDS in MANET. We 
also illustrate the challenges in the deployment of traditional IDS. Then, we present several 
IDS architectures for MANET and point out leader election as a key concept for cooper-
ative IDS. Moreover, we discuss other applications of leader election along with current 
solutions and existing problems. We further motivate the problem with an illustrative ex-
ample. Finally, we provide the basics of game theory and mechanism design. We briefly 
discuss some of the important concepts such as, dominant strategy, utility function, VCG 
mechanism, etc. These concepts help to better understand our leader election mechanism 
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since it is based on mechanism design theory. In chapter 4, we formally define our problem 
statements. We describe our leader election mechanism where the cost of analysis func-
tion, reputation model and payment designs are given. Finally we analyze our mechanisms 
against selfish and malicious nodes. Chapter 5 devises the election algorithm needed to han-
dle the election process. We also provide the proof of correctness and security properties of 
the algorithm along with performance analysis. In chapter 6, we provide a comprehensive 
simulation to evaluate the performance of our model. We compare our model with random 
and connectivity model against different performance matrices. Lastly, chapter 7 provides 




In this chapter, the necessity of intrusion detection system is given through presenting some 
unique attacks targeting a MANET. We then discuss why traditional IDS is not suitable 
for MANET followed by the proposed IDS architectures, where we point out that leader 
election is a significant issue for IDS in MANET. Moreover, we show the limitations of 
the present solutions with an illustrative example. Finally, we briefly explain the basics of 
mechanism design since our proposed approach for leader election is based on it. 
2.1 Attacks Unique to MANET 
Security is one of the major challenges in adopting MANETs in different applications [12, 
33]. The decentralized nature and dynamic topology of MANETs are unique characteris-
tics that render them more vulnerable to attacks than network architectures. Since all the 
nodes in a MANET are peers, potential damages caused by a compromised node can be 
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significantly higher than in traditional networks. An intruder that compromises a mobile 
node can destroy the communication by broadcasting false routing information, providing 
incorrect link state information, and overflowing other nodes with unnecessary routing traf-
fic. Ultimately, this would lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the whole network. 
Moreover, MANET is particularly susceptible to many attacks due to their open medium. 
On the other hand, the detection and prevention techniques are seriously constrained by 
the more stringent resources constraints. To better understand the threats in MANET, be-
low we present the taxonomy of some known attacks, which are unique to MANET. Our 
comparative study of these attacks demonstrates the need for IDS in MANET. 
Rushing Attack The Rushing attack is an effective Denial of Service (DoS) attack against 
most (secure) routing protocols [37]. In an on-demand routing protocol, a node wishing to 
find a route to another node usually broadcasts ROUTE REQUEST packets. In order to limit 
the performance overhead, existing protocols usually forward only one ROUTE REQUEST 
from a route discovery, which is taken advantage of by this attack. A relatively weak 
attacker can either keep the network interfaces of his neighboring nodes full or forward 
packets faster than others so to increase the probability that routes including him will be 
chosen by communicating nodes. Existing (secure) routing protocols, such as AODV [11], 
Adriadne [36], ARAN [69] and SAODV [86], are vulnerable to rushing attack. 
Flooding Attack The Ad Hoc Flooding attack [33, 39, 81, 84] is launched at the net-
work layer in which the attacker congests the network by flooding it with Route Request 
(RREQ) packets. The attacker could also choose random IP addresses in case s/he does 
8 
not know the network topology. After selecting these IP addresses, the attacker will launch 
massive RREQ messages without taking into consideration the RREQ_RATELIMIT, and 
without waiting for a route reply (RREP). The routing tables of the attacked nodes will be 
exhausted, which will deny these nodes from receiving any new route requests. 
Packet Dropping Attack The Packet Dropping attack can be caused by two kinds of 
nodes: Malicious [33,39,54] and selfish [57,58,72,83]. The former refers to compromised 
node, whereas the latter refers to node who wants to save energy by not forwarding others' 
packets. This attack is due to the nature of MANETs where cooperation between nodes is 
needed to forward their routing packets. This fact renders MANETs especially vulnerable 
to such a denial of service attack. 
Sybil Attack In Sybil attack [87,89,90], an attacker forges multiple, nonexistent identi-
ties in the MANET. Manipulating different identities in a network enables a malicious node 
to control services, which are otherwise accessible only by coordination between several 
distinct nodes. Roughly speaking, this attack allows a malicious node to have large influ-
ence on the services in the network. Sybil Attack is performed when one entity presents 
multiple identities to one or more other entities. 
Invisible Node Attack The authors in [4] give a strict definition of the Invisible Node 
attack: In any protocol that depends on identification for any functionality, any node that 
effectively participates in that protocol without revealing its identity is an invisible node 
and the action and protocol impact is termed an Invisible Node Attack. This attack is not 
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the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, but a special type of MITM attack [4, 53]. In 
MANET, this attack is possible due to the fact that communication is performed by means 
of broadcasting [29]. A malicious node M that stands between nodes A and B can just 
silently repeat messages from A to B and messages from B to A, making A and B think 
they are communicating to each other directly. Cryptographic mechanisms are of no help 
in preventing this attack. 
Wormhole Attack The Wormhole attack is a severe attack in MANETs that is particu-
larly challenging to defend against [19,34,38,52,67,71]. The wormhole attack can take 
place without compromising any nodes, authenticity of communication, or confidentiality. 
During a wormhole attack, a malicious node uses a path outside the network to route mes-
sages to another compromised node. Wormhole attacks are hard to discover because the 
path that is used to pass on information is usually not part of the actual network. Inter-
estingly, a wormhole lowers the time taken for a packet to reach its destination which in 
itself is not harmful. However, as wormholes fake a route that is shorter than reality, it can 
confuse routing mechanisms, which rely on the knowledge about distances between nodes. 
The wormhole attack can be initiated in two modes [47]. In the hidden mode, the attackers 
suppress their identities and remain hidden from others. In the hidden mode the attackers 
act as two simple transceivers and do not require any cryptographic keys to launch the at-
tack. In the participation mode, the attackers use valid cryptographic keys and participate 
in the routing as legitimate nodes. 
10 
Black Hole Attack In a Black Hole attack, a malicious node impersonates a destination 
node by sending a spoofed route reply packet to a source node that initiates a route dis-
covery. By doing this, a malicious node can deprive the traffic from a source node to a 
real destination. First, the attack can occur when the malicious node on the path directly 
attacks the data traffic passing through it. This black hole attack [54] takes place when the 
intermediate node drops the packets after the agreement to forward the packets. It can hap-
pen for various reasons, such as selfishness, packet overload, link broken or maliciousness. 
Two mechanisms have been introduced in [54] to defend the attack, namely, the watchdog 
and the pathrater. A second type of black hole attack [40,41,77] is to attack routing control 
traffic. This happens when a source node broadcasts a RREQ packet in search of desti-
nation. A malicious node, without checking in its cache table, sends RREP packet to the 
source node claiming the fresh route to the destination. If this packet reaches the source 
node before any other RREP packet, a false route is created. Thus, a malicious node can 
absorb data packets without forwarding them to the destination. 
Sinkhole Attack A Sinkhole attack [22,49,61] is actually a more sophisticated version 
of the black hole attack. It works by making a malicious node look especially attractive 
to the surrounding nodes with respect to routing. A malicious node finds out and uses 
the loopholes in a routing protocol to attract as much traffic as it can from a particular 
area, and thus creating a metaphorical sinkhole [46]. Sinkhole attacks can also be used 
to act as a base for initiating other attacks [51], such as wormhole attack, eavesdropping, 
data alteration, etc. Since all the traffic typically flows through the compromised node, a 
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wormhole attack would therefore become more effective and easier to achieve. 
Stealth Attack In a Stealth attack [1,30,43], the attacker acts remotely, where even 
victim is not aware of the attack. Thus, this attack is hard to trace. It allows an attacker to 
partition a network, reduce its output, hijack and filter traffic to and from the victim nodes. 
The attack uses three measures [1]: Impersonation, overloading and lying. There are two 
kinds of stealth attacks, both based on entering false entry and removing valid entries in 
the routing table of honest node. The first type aims to reduce the output and isolate victim 
nodes of the network. The second type aims to hijack traffic to and from specific victim 
nodes in order to perform malicious actions like eavesdropping or packet filtering. 
Location-Related Attacks In MANETs, the location information of nodes is very sen-
sitive. Once the location information is obtained, it can be used by position-based routing 
protocols which are good alternatives of topology-based routing protocols [16]. Adver-
saries will try to mislead nodes in obtaining wrong location information about others. This 
shows a need for secure localization techniques [15,24,50,82] which will prevent both the 
internal and external attackers to misinterpret the location of nodes. On the other hand, 
these protocols are vulnerable to location information disclosure attack [17,20,26]. Loca-
tion information should not be available to unauthorized nodes. If an adversary has all the 
location information, then it becomes easier to launch an attack against that network. 
Table 1 summarizes and compares the attacks mentioned above. It indicates whether 
each attack requires collaboration among attackers, whether it can be detected or prevented 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2 Intrusion Detection System in MANET 
From the above section, we can see that the proactive approaches (i.e., cryptography and 
authentication) and other techniques (i.e., secure routing [85], [35], [36]) are not sufficient 
to guarantee security in MANETs. Hence an IDS is needed as a second line of defence. 
2.2.1 Traditional IDS Systems 
IDS is defined as a system which monitors and analyzes activities of a computer or network 
system to determine whether there are any abnormal activities that violate the security. In 
other words, IDS is based on a captured audit data and reasoning about evidence in the 
data to determine whether the system/network is under attack [59]. Thus, IDS has two 
components: Data collection and data analysis. Below we describe them briefly. 
Data Collection Component 
Data collection component is responsible for collecting different types of data, such as key-
board input, command-based logs, application-based logs, network traffic, etc. According 
to the type of the audit data collected, we can classify the IDS into two categories [6]. 
Host based IDS Host based IDS depends on the operating system audit data to analyze 
the events resulting from programs or users on the host. It is able to detect abnormal 
actions such as repeated failed access attempts, changes to system files, etc. by monitoring 
real time system usage. 
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Network based IDS Network based IDS runs at the switches, gateways, or routers in 
order to analyze the captured packets that traverse through the network. 
Data Analysis Component 
Once the data is collected, data analysis component analyzes the data for possible intru-
sions. The techniques that the data analysis component uses to analyze the data can be 
categorized into three kinds [3, 59]: Signature based detection, anomaly based detection 
and specification based detection. 
Anomaly-based IDS The Anomaly detection technique considers an activity as abnor-
mal when it's deviate from the recognized normal usage. It must first be trained using 
normal data before it can be released in an operative detection mode. The main advantage 
of this model is that it can detect unknown attacks. On the other hand, its disadvantage is 
that it has high false positive alarm rate when normal user profiles, operating system, or 
network behavior vary widely from their normal behavior. 
Signature-based (misuse detection) IDS Signature based detection compares the activi-
ties of a user with patterns of well-known intrusions for intruders attempting to compromise 
a system. The main advantage is that it can accurately detect instances of known intru-
sions. On the other hand, the disadvantage of misuse detection is that anomalous patterns 
are based on known attacks; therefore new attacks cannot be detected. Besides, it needs a 
large database of intrusion signatures which need to be updated periodically. 
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Specification-based IDS A set of constraints is defined by the system to describe the 
proper execution of a program or protocol. IDS monitors and captures data from the exe-
cution and considers it abnormal if it deviates from the defied variables. 
Challenges of Traditional IDS 
The IDS for wired network which has been developed over the years cannot be directly ap-
plied in the wireless network because of some major differences between the two networks. 
The unique characteristics of MANET such as mobility and open wireless medium make 
IDS deployment harder. Unlike traditional networks, there are no fixed chokepoints/bot-
tlenecks where firewall or IDS can be deployed. Hence, more nodes need to run their IDS 
and cooperate with each other to ensure security. It is very inefficient in terms of resource 
consumption since mobile nodes are energy limited. Also these mobile nodes have compu-
tational limitation. Besides, both anomaly and signature based techniques are not suitable 
for MANET [45]. Anomaly detection needs a long training before deployment. Since the 
network changes very often in MANET, it is hard to model a normal behavior. On the other 
hand, signature based technique requires a database of attacks which need to be stored in 
every mobile host which is unsuitable for these computationally simple nodes. Since the 
current IDS techniques cannot be applied directly to MANETs, many intrusion detection 
architectures have been proposed to appeal the characteristics of MANETs. Next section 
presents different IDS architectures for MANET. 
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2.2.2 Architectures for IDS in MANET 
In this section, we review several IDS architectures that have been proposed to appeal 
the characteristics of MANETs. In traditional networks, IDSs can be classified into two 
main categories based on audit data as either host-based or network-based. IDSs can also 
be divided into anomaly-based systems, signature-based systems, or specification-based 
systems. In MANETs, IDSs can further be divided into two types based on the presence of 
cooperation between nodes: Non-cooperative and cooperative IDS. Figure 1 summarizes 







• Distributed and Cooperative IDS 
• Local Intrusion Detection System 
• Hierarchical Intrusion Detection System 
• Multiple-sensor based distributed IDS 
• Zone Based Intrusion Detection System 
• Cluster based Intrusion Detection System 
Figure 1: IDS architecture for MANET 
Non-cooperative Intrusion Detection Systems 
In this architectures, an IDS runs independently on a node to detect intrusions and there is 
no cooperation among nodes in the network. Each node makes decision based on its own 
collected information. This architecture is not popular in MANETs since nodes might not 
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be able to detect intrusions based on only its information. In [73,74], a non-cooperative 
signature-based intrusion detection architecture has been proposed. The authors argue that 
message exchange between the nodes increases the complexity and resource consumption 
in MANET. Misuse technique should be used since anomaly detection technique results 
high false positive for a network like MANET where the network characteristic varies a lot 
and lacks a normal behavior. Two polynomial complexity algorithms have been proposed 
for optimal node selection for running IDS module. The objective is to select a dominating 
set of nodes which will be able to capture all the traffics of the networks. 
Cooperative Intrusion Detection Systems 
A more popular category of IDS architecture is the cooperative IDS. In this architecture, 
nodes cooperate with each other to detect intrusions. This type of architecture is suitable 
for MANET since some attacks cannot be detected correctly without sharing the informa-
tion. For example, an attack can be divided into multiple packets and each packet can be 
sent in different routes. Since data might not be comprehensive, all neighbor IDSs must 
cooperate in order to detect intrusion. There are two approaches to achieve cooperation: 
Peer-to-peer and hierarchical approach [7]. In peer-to-peer approach, each node runs inde-
pendent IDS to detect intrusions and response consequently. Nodes share messages with 
others and thus cooperation is achieved. On the other hand, different nodes have differ-
ent responsibilities in hierarchical approach. Nodes are divided into clusters where normal 
nodes are mostly responsible for local data collection and cluster heads perform the data 
aggregation, correlation, etc. Below we provide some of the examples of both approaches. 
18 
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Figure 2: DCIDS architecture for MANET 
Distributed and Cooperative Intrusion Detection System (DCIDS) This is an example 
of peer-to-peer approaches, which is proposed by Zhang and Lee [88]. In this model, each 
node independently runs an IDS agent for locally collecting, analyzing data and responding 
them accordingly. At the same time, nodes can cooperate with each other globally to detect 
an intrusion which has weak local evidence. The internal of an IDS agent can be structured 
into six different modules as shown in Figure 2. Local Data Collection collects the real-
time audit data (i.e., system calls activities, communication activities, and other traces). 
Local Detection Engine analyzes the collected data to find the evidence of anomalies. Lo-
cal Response alerts the local user when an anomaly is detected by local detection engine 
with strong evidence. Global Response initiates the response to an intrusion depending on 
the type of the intrusion and the type of network protocol and applications. Cooperative 
Detection Engine is used when the certainty of the evidence for detection of an anomaly is 
weak. The IDS agent requests the cooperation of neighboring IDS agents by this engine. 
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Finally, Secure Communication is needed to communicate with other agents securely. 
Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) 
is a peer-to-peer cooperative architecture implemented on each node to collect data and 
detect attacks independently [2]. It can also be extended for global intrusion detection by 
cooperating with other LIDS. In this architecture, two types of data are exchanged among 
LIDS: Security data (to obtain information form collaborating nodes) and intrusion alerts 
(to inform others of locally detected intrusion). The authors proposed to use SNMP (Simple 
Network Management Protocol) data located in MIBs (Management Information Source) 
as an audit data source for LIDS. 
Figure 3: LIDS architecture for MANET 
The LIDS architecture consists of several components that are shown in Figure 3. The 
Local LIDS Agent is responsible for local intrusion detection and response. In addition, it 
responses to intrusion alert sent from other agents to protect itself from such an intrusion. 
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Local MIB Agent is in charge of providing a means of collecting MIB variables for local 
LIDS agent or mobile agents. Local MIB agent will be an interface with SNMP agent if 
SNMP runs on the node. Otherwise, a SNMP based agent should be developed to permit 
update and retrieval of the MIB variables used by intrusion detection. Communication 
Framework is used to facilitate internal and external communication with LIDS. Mobile 
Agent is to collect and process data on other nodes by distributing their LID. Then, their 
results are sent to LIDS or another node for more investigations. Mobile Agent Place is 
responsible for a security control of mobile agents. 
Figure 4: Hierarchical IDS architecture for MANET 
Hierarchical Intrusion Detection System Since the nature of MANETs is distributed 
and requires cooperation of other nodes, hierarchical IDS architecture [25] has been pro-
posed for a hierarchical network divided into clusters as shown in Figure 4. In this ar-
chitecture, each IDS running on every node is locally responsible to monitor, determine 
intrusions and decide on detected intrusions. In addition, a cluster-head like other nodes is 
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responsible for its node as well as globally for its cluster to collect data, detect intrusions 
and globally response to network intrusions. MANET is structured in more than two lev-
els. The first level cluster-heads are nodes labeled " 1 " which are called leaf nodes while 
the second level cluster-heads are nodes labeled "2" and so on. To form the hierarchy, 
leader election algorithm is used in each cluster to elect a cluster-head. The authors did 
not elaborate the election procedure but suggested some criteria for selecting cluster-heads. 
The selection should be done based on connectivity, proximity, resistance to compromise, 




Packet-level User-level — System-level 
Figure 5: Multiple-sensor based IDS architecture for MANET 
Multiple-sensor based distributed Intrusion Detection System Kachirski and Guha 
proposed an intrusion detection model using multiple sensors [45]. It follows the hierarchi-
cal approach. The task of intrusion detection has been divided into three different modules 
and represented by a mobile agent, which is shown in Figure 5. Each node is responsible 
to host different IDS agent to balance the workload of the system. Monitoring Agent is for 
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host monitoring and network monitoring. Every node of network is monitored by the host 
monitoring agent. The agent monitors system and application level activities. On the other 
hand, certain nodes have network monitoring agent. This is done to preserve the total com-
putational and battery power of mobile hosts. Network monitoring agents are responsible 
for collecting and analyzing network level packets. Decision Agent works at host level for 
local intrusions. Since certain nodes collect and analyze network level information, only 
these nodes have network level decision agent to make collective decision about network 
level intrusions. Action Agent is hosted by every node. Based on the monitoring, each 
node is able to take appropriate response of a given intrusion. The network is divided into 
multiple clusters where there exists a cluster head for each cluster. The cluster-heads host 
network level monitoring and decision agents on behalf of the cluster. In this architecture, 
the cluster head is selected based on the connectivity of each node. A detailed algorithm 
for electing a cluster-head is given in [45]. 
Zone Based Intrusion Detection System (ZBIDS) ZBIDS follows the hierarchical ap-
proach [75]. The whole network is divided into non overlapping zones, where nodes are 
of two types: Interzone or intrazone nodes. Nodes that have physical connections to the 
nodes of other zones are known as interzone nodes, where as nodes without any connec-
tion are intrazone nodes. The formation and the maintenance of the zones need geographic 
partitioning or clustering algorithms. Global Positioning System (GPS) or other methods 
are needed to find the physical location of each node to determine its zone identity by map-
ping its physical location to the predefined zone map. The interzone nodes are responsible 
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for global aggregation and correlation while intrazone nodes are responsible for local data 
analysis. 
Cluster based Intrusion Detection System This architecture is similar to Kachirski and 
Guha's architecture [45], proposed by Hang and Lee [39]. The intrusion detection system 
is anomaly based and nodes compute many different features of the network. Since it takes 
significant computational cost to obtain traffic-related features, the network is divided into 
clusters. The cluster-heads help to compute the traffic-related features and the citizen nodes 
compute and transmit the non-traffic related features to the cluster-heads. Thus the overall 
cluster-wise feature collection cost is reduced since a lot of features are related to traffic-
related. The authors propose a random election procedure for electing cluster-heads. This 
election takes place after every fixed interval to elect a new leader. In addition, a cluster 
recovery protocol also has been proposed to adjust lost nodes (nodes without leader) due 
to mobility. 
Besides, there are some other IDS models which are based on cooperation enforce-
ment [13,14,57]. These techniques mainly focus on the selfish behavior of nodes regarding 
forwarding others packets. Selfish nodes can degrade the performance of the network by 
dropping others packet. To motivate the selfish nodes in routing, CONFIDANT [13] pro-
poses a reputation system where each node keeps track of the misbehaving nodes. The rep-
utation system is built on the negative evaluations rather than positive impression. When-
ever a specific threshold is exceeded, an appropriate action is taken against the node. There-
fore, nodes are motivated to participate by punishing the misbehaving ones through giving 
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a negative reputation. As a consequence of such a design, a malicious node can broadcast 
a negative impression about a node in order to be punished. On the other hand, CORE [57] 
is proposed as a cooperative enforcement mechanism based on monitoring and reputation 
systems. The goal of this model is to detect selfish nodes and enforce them to cooperate. 
Each node keeps track of other nodes' cooperation using reputation as a metric. CORE 
ensures that misbehaving nodes are punished by gradually excluding them from communi-
cation services. In this model, the reputation is calculated based on data monitored by local 
nodes and information provided by other nodes involved in each operation. 
2.3 Leader Election in IDS 
In this section, we present the application of leader election in IDS along with other possible 
applications in MANET. We then describe the current techniques and their limitations with 
an illustrative example. 
2.3.1 Applications of Leader Election 
Leader election is a significant issue of MANET and it is the key concept of Cooperative 
IDS. The main difference between the two approaches of cooperative IDS is the organiza-
tion of the nodes. In peep-to-peer approach, each node needs to communicate with other 
nodes to achieve the cooperation. This results in higher communication overhead as the 
number of nodes increases. To reduce this overhead, nodes can be organized into hierarchy 
by forming clusters and electing a leader for that cluster to distribute the responsibilities. 
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This is the key concept of hierarchy approaches [25,39,45] of cooperative IDS. Leader 
election is a significant issue of MANET and has been addressed in different research 
work [8,48,76,78]. 
Like Intrusion Detection System (IDS), leader election is needed for routing [9] and key 
distribution [10,27,68] in MANET. In key management, a central key distributor is needed 
to update the keys of the nodes. In routing, nodes are grouped into small clusters and each 
cluster elects a cluster head (leader) to forward the packets of other nodes. Thus, one node 
can stay alive while others can be in the energy-saving mode. Hence, the performance of 
the network significantly depends on the efficient clustering and leader election algorithm. 
2.3.2 Problems of Current Techniques 
Many clustering and leader election algorithms have been proposed. These algorithms 
can be classified into two categories [76]: Cluster-first or leader-first. In cluster-first ap-
proach [48], a cluster is formed then nodes belonging to that cluster elect a leader node. In 
the leader-first approach [8], a set of leader nodes is elected first then the other nodes are 
assigned to different leader nodes. Whether it is cluster-first or leader-first, the election of 
leader node is done in three ways: randomly, based on connectivity (node's degree) and 
based on a node's weight. Here, the weight normally refers to the remaining energy of a 
node [79]. In random election [39] model, a node is elected randomly as a leader by a 
group/cluster of Nodes. If there are N nodes in a cluster, then the probability of any partic-
ular node to be leader is 1/N. Random model does not consider the remaining resources of 
nodes or the presence of selfish nodes for electing leader node. In connectivity model [45], 
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nodes with highest degree (connection to other nodes) are elected as leader nodes for the 
network. Again, the solution ignores both the difference in remaining resources and the 
selfishness issue. We motivate further discussions through a concrete example. 
Figure 6 illustrates a MANET composed often nodes labeled from Nx to Nw. These 
nodes are located in 5 one-hop clusters where nodes N5 and Ng belong to more than one 
cluster and have limited resources level. We assume that each node has different energy 
level which is considered as private information. At this point, electing nodes N5 and Ng 
as leaders are clearly not desirable since losing them will cause a partition in the network 
and nodes will not be able to communicate with each other. However, with the random 
election model [39], nodes N5 and JV9 will have equal probability, compared to others, 
in being elected as leaders. Whereas nodes JV5 and Ng will definitely be elected under the 
connectivity index-based approach due to their connectivity indices [45]. Moreover, a naive 
approach for electing nodes with the most remaining resources will also fail since nodes' 
energy level is considered as private information and nodes might reveal fake information 
if that increases their own benefits. Finally, if nodes N2, N5 and Ng are selfish and elected 
as leaders using the above models, they will refuse to run their IDS for serving others. The 
consequences of such a refusal will lead normal nodes to launch their IDS and thus die 
faster than others. 
We pointed out the problems of random model and connectivity model. We believe that 
weight based leader election should be the proper method for election. But unfortunately, 
the information regarding the remaining energy is private to a node and thus not verifiable. 
Previous methods assume that each node is associated with a weight [9] or there exist a 
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Figure 6: An example scenario of leader election in MANET 
trusted authority to certify each node's metric (weight) which is used to elect a leader. 
We consider these assumptions as quite strong for MANET. Since nodes might behave 
selfishly, they might lie about their resource level to avoid being leader if there is no other 
mechanism to motivate them. Thus, we address the selfish problem and propose a solution 
which is able to balance the resources of nodes considering the selfish behavior of nodes. 
2.4 Mechanism Design Background 
The balance of IDS resource consumption problem can be modeled using mechanism de-
sign theory with an objective function that depends on the private information of the play-
ers. In our case, the private information of the player is the cost of analysis which depends 
on the player's energy level. Here, rational players select to deliver untruthful information 
about their preferences, if that leads to individually better outcome. The main goal of us-
ing mechanism design [23] is to address this problem by designing incentives for players 
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(nodes) to provide truthful information about their preferences over different outcomes. In 
the rest of the chapter, we discuss the important concepts of game theory and mechanism 
design which are important to better understand our mechanism. A more general overview 
of mechanism design can be found in [23,42,55,64]. 
Mechanism design is a sub-field of microeconomics and game theory [55]. Mecha-
nism design uses game theory [60] tools to achieve the desired goals. The main difference 
between game theory and mechanism design is that the former can be used to study what 
could happen when independent players act selfishly. On the other hand, mechanism design 
allows a game designer to define rules in terms of the Social Choice Function (SCF) such 
that players will play according to these rules. The applications of mechanism design are 
diverse and it has been used successfully in electronic market design, resource allocation 
problems, task scheduling problems, etc. In the following, we present the basic defini-
tions and concepts of game theory that are used in mechanism design. Then, we introduce 
mechanism design which is the fundamental concept of our proposed model. 
2.4.1 Game Theory 
Games are defined by a number of players that interact by forming a coalition or possibly 
threaten each other by taking actions under uncertainty. Each player finally receive some 
benefits, payoffs, or loss some rewards or payoffs. Thus, a game is an interaction model, 
where each player has its own strategies and possible payoffs. Game theory is the tool that 
studies the relationship and interaction, which are established and broken in the course of 
cooperation and competition between the nodes. 
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Basic Definitions 
A normal game consists of a finite set of players P = {1 ,2 , . . . , n}, a strategy set si, 
for each player and a set of outcomes, O. Below, we explain different elements of a game 
through an example where two players have two strategies each. Figure 7 shows the payoffs 
for each strategy profile of the game, where the columns represent the strategies of player 
2 and the rows represent the strategies of player 1. The intersection between the row and 
the column represents the payoff of player 1 and 2. Thus the utility of player 1 and player 







Figure 7: Example of a two player game 
Strategy Each player can select his strategy from a strategy set s». For example, the 
strategy set for each player is Si = S2 = {A, B}. Strategies can be two types: pure 
and mixed. Pure strategies are deterministic while a mixed strategy is the probability dis-
tribution over the set of pure strategies. A strategy profile s — {si, s 2 , . . . , sn} is the 
vector of strategies. It is the set of all the strategies chosen by the players, where as 
s_i = {si,..., Si_i,si+i,..., sn} denotes the strategies of all the players except player 
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i. Strategy profile is the outcome, o(s) e O, of the game. For example, the possible out-
comes of the game are (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), and (B, B). Each player chooses its strategy 
in such a way that its preferred outcome occurs and the preference over the outcome of the 
game is expressed by the utility function. 
Utility Function Each player has preferences over the outcomes of the game. Preferences 
over outcomes are represented through a utility function, Wj. Utility function of a player 
i can be considered as a transformation of the outcome to a real number. It is expressed 
mathematically as: 
m : O - • 5ft 
A player prefers outcome, o\ over outcome, o2 if Wj(oi) > Mj(o2). A rational player 
always wants to maximize its utility. Thus, it chooses a strategy which will increase its 
expected utility given the preferences of the outcomes, the structure of the game and the 
belief of others strategies. 
Solution Concepts 
Game theory uses different techniques to determine the outcome of the game. These out-
comes are the stable or the equilibrium points of the game. The most well known equilib-
rium concept is known as Nash equilibrium. It states that each player plays its best strategy 
to maximize the utility, given the strategies of the other players. 
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Nash Equilibrium A strategy profile s* = {s*, s%, • • •, s*} is Nash equilibrium if this 
strategy profile maximizes the utility of every player, i. Formally 
Vi Ui{o(sl sti)) > Ui{o(s'h s*_i)),Wi 
Nash equilibrium is the point where no player can take advantage of the other player's 
strategy to improve his own position. Given the above example, if player 2 predicts that 
player 1 will choose strategy A then choosing a strategy other than strategy A will lead to 
a loss for player 2. Although Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept of game theory 
but the assumptions of this technique is too strong for some scenarios. Nash equilibrium 
assumes that every player has the perfect information about the other players and all the 
players must reach the same Nash equilibrium point. 
Dominant Strategy Strategy s* is the dominant strategy for player i, if it maximizes the 
expected utility against all possible strategies of the other players. 
Ui(s*, s_t-) > Ui(si, s_j), Vs_i, Vs,: ^ s* 
A strategy is dominant if it is the best strategy for the player against any strategies of 
other players. In dominant strategy equilibrium, every player has a dominant strategy. It 
is a very robust solution concept since it does not require a player to have information of 
other players. In the case of mechanism design, a social choice function implementation 
is much more desirable by dominant strategy than Nash implementation. It is because 
Nash implementation requires each agent to be well informed about others which is not 
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practical in the case of mechanism design. An ideal mechanism provides each player with 
a dominant strategy and thus implements a solution for a multi-agent optimization problem. 
2.4.2 Mechanism Design 
A standard mechanism design model is defined by a set of N players. Each player holds a 
private information 9i} which is called the type of the player i. The type 6i is drawn from 
each player's available type set 0 j and it describes how each player values all possible 
outcomes. Each player i has a utility Ui($i, o) for given outcome o G 0 and type 9i, where 
O is the set of possible outcomes. The goal of mechanism design is to implement a system 
wide solution which is defined as social choice function (SCF). 
Social Choice Function A social choice function is a function / : 61 x . . . x 9 n —> O, 
which gives an output f(9) e O, given the types of the players, 9 = (9\,..., 9n). 
The mechanism design problem is to define some rules that are used to determine the 
solution of the social choice function despite players own self interest. 
Mechanism A mechanism, M = (Si,..., Sn, g(.)) defines a set of strategies for each 
player and an outcome rule, g : S\ x . . . x Sn —> O such that, g(s) is the outcome 
implemented by the mechanism for the strategy profile, s = ( s i , . . . , sn). 
In other words, a mechanism defines strategies for the nodes and rules to compute the 
outcome based on players strategies. A mechanism, M implements a social choice func-
tion, /(.) if the outcome g(.) of the mechanism is based on equilibrium players' strategies 
and also a solution for the social choice function for all (9\,..., 9n) e 61 x . . . x On. 
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Mechanism Implementation A mechanism, M = (S\,..., Sn, g(.)) implements a so-
cial choice function, /(.) if g((Si(0i),... ,£*(#„)) = f(8), where the strategy profile, 
s* = (s\,..., s*) is the equilibrium point of the mechanism. 
Here, the equilibrium strategy profile can be based on any equilibrium concept, such 
as Nash, Bayesian-Nash, dominant, etc. Generally, dominant strategy implementation is 
preferred since it has less assumption than other concepts regarding players. 
The Revelation Principle 
It is hard to identify which social choice functions are implementable since in theory, we 
need to consider all possible mechanisms. The revelation principle states that we can re-
strict ourselves to a small class of mechanism which is known as direct revelation mech-
anism. This is the simplest type of mechanism where each player is required to reveal its 
type as its strategy. 
Direct Revelation Mechanism In direct revelation mechanism, the strategy of a player i 
is Si = 0i and g(6) = f(6) for all 0 e 9 i x . . . x 0 n . 
In other words, the strategy of a player is to report its type to the mechanism. The 
revelation principle also states that we can further restrict to such direct revelation mecha-
nism where truth telling is the optimal strategy of the players. The social choice functions 
implemented by such mechanisms are known incentive compatible. 
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Incentive Compatible An incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism implements 
a social choice function, / ( . ) , if the mechanism, M — ( 0 i , . . . , Qn,g(-)) has an equilib-
rium (si,..., s*), where Si(6j) = Oi for all 8i e 0 , and for all player i. 
In other words, the incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism has an equilib-
rium point where each player reports its type truthfully. If the concept of equilibrium is 
dominant strategy, then this mechanism is said to be strategy proof. Thus, the revelation 
principle restricts our attention to only incentive compatible direct mechanism to determine 
which social choice function are possible to implement and which are not. 
Quasi-Linear Preferences 
One common assumption in mechanism design is that players have quasi-linear utility func-
tion. A general form of a quasi-linear function for a player i with type 6i is: 
Ui(o,6i) =Vi(x,0i) -pi 
where x is an element of a discrete choice set K defined by the outcome o and Pi is the 
payment of the player. The preference of each player from the output is calculated by a 
valuation function, Vi(x,9i). This is a quantification in terms of a real number to evaluate 
the value of x. Thus the utility of a node is calculated as the combination of output mea-
sured by valuation function and the payment defined by the mechanism. As an example, 
we can consider an auction of an item. The outcome of the auction is the determination of 
a winner and a payment which the winner has to pay for the item. If the value of item to 
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the winner is 20 then it has a positive utility as long as the payment is less then 20. Note 
that Ui is maximized only when Pi is given by the mechanism. 
The question is: How to design the payments in a way that makes truth-telling the 
dominant strategy? The VCG mechanism answers this question by giving the nodes a fixed 
payment independent of the nodes' valuation. 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms 
VCG mechanism is a well known mechanism which was proposed by Vickrey [80], Clarke 
[21] and Groves [31]. VCG is an efficient and strategy-proof direct revelation mechanism. 
It is used to solve problems in which players have quasi-linear preferences. In VCG mech-
anism, each player gives its type, 0; = Sj(0;) as an input to the mechanism which may not 
be the true type. Based on the input vector, 9 — (8i,...,6n) the mechanism computes an 
output in terms of a choice rule, k and a payment rule, Pi .The choice rule of VCG is: 
k*{9) = arg max y ^ Vj(x, 9j) 
xeK 
The selection of k* is such that it maximizes the total valuation over all the players. 
Thus, VCG mechanism produces efficient allocation. The payment rule of VCG is: 
Pi(e) = hi(9-i)-Y^vj(k*,0j) 
where hi : 9_i —> 5ft is an arbitrary function which does not depend on the type of 
player i. Therefore, the payment of a player is not influenced by its reported type. 
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Mechanism Design Applications 
Mechanism design has been extensively used in microeconomics for modeling solutions for 
various economical problems such as auctions. It has been used in computer science [63] 
for solving least cost path and task scheduling problems using algorithmic mechanism de-
sign. Distributed mechanism design based on VCG is first introduced in [28] to compute 
the lowest cost routes for all source-destination pairs and payments for transit nodes on all 
the routes. An extension of this work is given in [70] where the authors considered con-
sequences that may appear after the computation phase is finished. Currently in MANET, 
mechanism design is mainly used for routing purposes. Mechanism design has been used 
for routing purposes in MANETs, such as a truthful adhoc-VCG mechanism for finding the 
most cost-efficient route in the presence of selfish nodes [5]. In [18], the authors provide 
an incentive compatible auction scheme to enable packet forwarding services in MANETs 
using VCG; a continuous auction process is used to determine the distribution of band-
width and incentives are given as monetary rewards. Leader-election in IDS is significantly 
different from the above problems. We address selfishness in IDS leader election, which is 
a real problem that has not been addressed by previous approaches. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed different types of attacks which are unique to MANET and 
mentioned that proactive approaches are not enough to prevent these attacks. Intrusion de-
tection system is needed as a second line of defense to defend the network. We identified 
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the challenges of IDS and elaborated the new techniques of IDS architecture for MANET. 
We illustrated that leader election is a key concept for cooperative IDS and for other appli-
cations of MANET. We discussed the problems of the current solutions of leader election 
and motivated it with an example. To solve the problems of the current solutions, we use 
mechanism design in our proposed method. Finally, we reviewed the basics of game theory 
and mechanism design which are needed for the rest of the thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Leader Election Mechanisms 
In this chapter, we define formally the problem statement. Then, we describe our leader 
election mechanism where the cost of analysis function, reputation model and payment 
designs are given. Finally, we analyze our mechanisms against selfish and malicious nodes. 
3.1 Problem Statement 
We consider a MANET where each node has an IDS and a unique identity. To achieve 
the goal of electing the most cost efficient nodes as leaders in the presence of selfish and 
malicious nodes, the following challenges arise: First, the resource level that reflects the 
cost of analysis is considered as a private information. As a result, the nodes can reveal 
fake information about their resources if that could increase their own benefits. Second, the 
nodes might behave normally during the election but then deviate from normal behavior by 
not offering the IDS service to their voted nodes. 
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In our model, we consider MANET as an undirected graph G = (N, L) where N is the 
set of nodes and L is the set of bidirectional links. We denote the cost of analysis vector as 
C = {ci, c 2 , . . . , cn} where n is the number of nodes in N. We denote the election process 
as a function vtk(C, i) where vtk(C, i) = 1 if a node i votes for a node k; vtk(C, i) = 0, 
otherwise. We assume that each elected leader allocates the same budget B (in the number 
of packets) for each node that has voted for it. Knowing that, the total budget will be 
distributed among all the voting nodes according to their reputation. This will motivate 
the nodes to cooperate in every election round that will be held on every time TELECT-
Thus, the model will be repeatable. For example, if B = 25 packet/sec and the leader gets 
3 votes, then the leader's total sampling budget is 75 packet/sec. This value is divided 
among the 3 nodes based on their reputation value. The objective of minimizing the global 
cost of analysis while serving all the nodes can be expressed by the following Social Choice 
Function (SCF): 
SCF = S(C) = min ^ ck • ( J ] vtk(C, i) • B) (1) 
keN ieN 
Clearly, in order to minimize this SCF, the following must be achieved. First, we need 
to design incentives for encouraging each node in revealing its true cost of analysis value 
c, which will be addressed in this chapter. Second, we need to design an election algorithm 
that can provably minimize the above SCF while not incurring too much of performance 
overhead. This is addressed in chapter 5. 
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3.2 The Mechanism Model 
We treat the IDS resource consumption problem as a game where the N mobile nodes are 
the agents/players. Each node plays by revealing its own private information (cost of analy-
sis) which is based on the node's type 9i. The type 9i is drawn from each player's available 
type set ®i={Normal, Selfish}. Each player selects his own strategy/type according to how 
much the node values the outcome. If the player's strategy is normal then it reveals the true 
cost of analysis. In Section 3.3 a detailed analysis is given. We assume that each player i 
has a utility function [55]: 
UiiOj^Pi-ViieuotfiiO-i)) (2) 
where, #_; is the type of all the other nodes except i. V{ is the valuation of player i of 
the output o G O, knowing that O is the set of possible outcomes. In our case, if the node 
is elected then Vi is the cost of analysis Q. Otherwise vt is 0 since the node will not be the 
leader and hence there will be no cost to run the IDS. p; € 9ft is the payment given by the 
mechanism to the elected node. Payment is given in the form of reputation. Nodes that are 
not elected receive no payment. 
Note that, «j(0j) is what the player usually seeks to maximize. It reflects the amount 
of benefits gained by player i if he follows a specific type 6>,. Players might deviate from 
revealing the truthful valuation for the cost of analysis if that could lead to a better payoff. 
Therefore, our mechanism must be strategy-proof where truth-telling is the dominant strat-
egy. To play the game, every node declares its corresponding cost of analysis where the 
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cost vector C is the input of our mechanism. For each input vector, the mechanism calcu-
lates its corresponding output o = o{9\,... ,8n) and a payment vector p = (pi,... ,pn). 
Payments are used to motivate players to behave in accordance with the mechanism goals. 
In the following subsections, we will formulate the following components: 
1. Cost of analysis function: It is needed by the nodes to compute the valuation function. 
2. Reputation system: It is needed to show how: 
(a) Incentives are used once they are granted. 
(b) Misbehaving nodes are catched and punished. 
3. Payment design: It is needed to design the amount of incentives that will be given to 
the nodes based on VCG. 
3.2.1 Cost of Analysis Function 
During the design of the cost of analysis function, the following two problems arise: First, 
the energy level is considered as private and sensitive information and should not be dis-
closed publicly. Such a disclosure of information can be used maliciously for attacking the 
node with the least resources level. Second, if the cost of analysis function is designed only 
in terms of nodes' energy level, then the nodes with the low energy level will not be able to 
contribute and increase their reputation values. 
To solve the above problems, we design the cost of analysis function with the following 
two properties: Fairness and Privacy. The former is to allow nodes with initially less 
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resources to contribute and serve as leaders in order to increase their reputation. On the 
other hand, the latter is needed to avoid the malicious use of the resources level, which is 
considered as the most sensitive information. To avoid such attacks and to provide fairness, 
the cost of analysis is designed based on the reputation value, the expected number of time 
slots that a node wants to stay alive in a cluster and energy level. Note that the expected 
number of slots and energy level are considered as the nodes' private information. 
To achieve our goal, we assume that the nodes are divided into I energy classes with 
different energy levels. The lifetime of a node can be divided into time-slots. Each node 
i is associated with an energy level, denoted by Ei} and the number of expected alive 
slots is denoted by nTi. Based on these requirements, each node i has a power factor 
PFi = Ei/nTi. We introduce the set of I — 1 thresholds P = {pi,..., p;_i} to categorize 
the classes as follows: 
CL= < 
ck if PF <
 Pl 
di if Pi-i <PF<pt; ie [2,1 - 1] (3) 
ck ^/PF>p^_1 
The reputation of node i is denoted by i?j. Every node has a sampling budget based 
on its reputation. This is indicated by the percentage of sampling, PSi = ^ . The c* 
notation represents the cost of analysis for a single packet and Eids is used to express the 
energy needed to run the IDS for one time slot. The cost of analysis of each node can be 
calculated based on energy level. However, we considered energy level, expected lifetime 
and the present PS of node to calculate the cost of analysis. We can extend the cost of 
43 
analysis function to more realistic settings by considering the computational level and cost 
of collecting and analyzing traffic. Our cost-of-analysis function is formulated as follows: 
Cost-of-Analysis Function 
/* Nodes execute this function to calculate their cost*/ 
l . i f ( ^ < ^ s ) t h e n 
2. a = oo 
3. else 




 ~ PFi - Ei 
5. end if 
According to the above formulation, the nodes have an infinite cost of analysis if its 
remaining energy is less than the energy required to run the IDS for one time slot. This 
means that its remaining energy is too low to run the IDS for an entire time-slot. Otherwise, 
the cost of analysis is calculated through dividing the percentage of sampling by the power 
factor. The cost of analysis c is proportional to the percentage of sampling and is inversely 
proportional to the power factor. The rationale behind the definition of the function is the 
following. If the nodes have enough PS, they are not willing to loose their energy for 
running the IDS. On the other hand, if PF is larger, then the cost-of-analysis becomes 
smaller since the nodes have higher energy levels. In the rest of the paper, we will use cost 
and cost-of-analysis interchangeably. 
We show the effect of our cost function over PS through an example. Table 2 shows 
the PS for 20 nodes divided equally in 4 energy classes where nodes in class 4 have the 
most resources. Table 2 indicates that initially nodes belonging to lower energy level have 
a small budget. As the time goes by, the nodes belonging to lower energy class gains more 
budget while the budget of higher classes decreases. This justifies that our cost function is 
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Table 2: PS calculated by proposed cost function 
PS(Percentage of sampling) 
After 200 sec 
After 600 sec 

















able to balance the energy of the nodes and gives a fair budget to all nodes. 
3.2.2 Reputation System Model 
Before we design the payment, we need to show how the payment in the form of reputation 
can be used to: (1) Motivate nodes to behave normally and (2) punish the misbehaving 
nodes. Moreover, it can be used to determine whom to trust. To motivate the nodes in 
behaving normally in every election round, we relate the cluster's services to nodes' rep-
utation. This will create a competition environment that motivates the nodes to behave 
normally by saying the truth. To enforce our mechanism, a punishment system is needed to 
prevent nodes from behaving selfishly after the election. Misbehaving nodes are punished 
by decreasing their reputation and consequently are excluded from the cluster services if 
the reputation is less than a predefined threshold. As an extension to our model, we can 
extend our reputation system to include different sources of information such as routing 
and key distribution with different assigned weights. Figure 8 shows the abstract model of 
our reputation system where each node has the following components: 
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Figure 8: Reputation system model 
Monitor: It is used to monitor the behavior of the elected leader. To reduce the overall 
resource consumption, we randomly elect a set of nodes, known as checkers, to perform 
the monitoring process. The selected checkers mirror a small portion of the computation 
done by the leader so the checkers can tell whether the leader is actually carrying out 
its duty. We assume the checkers are cooperative because the amount of computation they 
conduct for monitoring the leader only amounts to a marginal resource consumption, which 
is dominated by the benefit of receiving intrusion detection service from the leader [65]. 
Information Exchange: It includes two types of information sharing: (1) The exchange 
of reputation with other nodes in other clusters (i.e., for services purposes). (2) To reduce 
the false positive rate, the checkers will exchange information about the behavior of the 
leader to make decision about the leader's behavior. 
Reputation System: It is defined in the form of a table that contains the ID of other 
nodes and their respective reputation R. The node that has the highest reputation can be 
considered as the most trusted node and is given priority in the cluster's services. Therefore, 
the rational nodes are motivated to increase their reputation value by participating in the 
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leader election. 
Threshold Check: It has two main purposes: (1) To verify whether nodes' reputation is 
greater than a predefined threshold. If the result is true then nodes' services are offered ac-
cording to nodes' reputation. (2) To verify whether a leader's behavior exceeds a predefined 
misbehaving threshold. According to the result, the punishment system is called. 
Service System: To motivate the nodes to participate in every election round, the amount 
of detection service provided to each node is based on the node's reputation. Each elected 
leader has a budget for sampling and thus only limited services can be offered. This budget 
is distributed among the nodes according to their reputation. Besides, this reputation can 
also be used for packet forwarding. Packets of highly reputed nodes should always be 
forwarded. On the other hand, if the source node has an unacceptably low reputation then 
its packet will have less priority. Hence, in every round, nodes will try to increase their 
reputation by becoming the leader in order to increase their services. 
Punishment System: To improve the performance and reduce the false-positive rate of 
checkers in catching and punishing a misbehaving leader, we have formulated in [65] a co-
operative game-theoretical model to efficiently catch and punish misbehaving leaders with 
low false positive rate. Our catch-and-punish model was made up of k detection-levels, 
representing different levels of selfish behaviors of the leader-IDS. This enables us to bet-
ter respond to the misbehaving leader-IDS depending on which detection-level it belongs 
to. Hence, the percentage of checkers varies with respect to the detection-level. Once 
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the detection exceeds a predefined threshold, the leader will be punished by decreasing its 
reputation value. 
3.2.3 CILE Payment Design 
In Cluster Independent Leader Election (CILE), each node must be monitored by a leader 
node that will analyze the packets for other ordinary nodes. Based on the cost of analysis 
vector C, nodes will cooperate to elect a set of leader nodes that will be able to analyze 
the traffic across the whole network and handle the monitoring process. This increases the 
efficiency and balances the resource consumption of an IDS in the network. Our mecha-
nism provides payments to the elected leaders for serving others (i.e., offering the detection 
service). The payment is based on a per-packet price that depends on the number of votes 
the elected nodes get. The nodes that do not get any vote from others will not receive 
any payment. The payment is in the form of reputations, which are then used to allocate 
the leader's sampling budget for each node. Hence, any node will strive to increase its 
reputation in order to receive more IDS services from its corresponding leader. 
Theorem 1: Using the following design of payment, truth-telling is the dominant strat-
egy: 
Pk = J2 uf fc(c' {)BP^ where (4) 
ieN 
1 




E cj E vtAc\ck = oo, z) - ^
 Cj J2 vti(c> *)] (5) 
Proof: Given any cost vector C, the total cost of node fc can be expressed as follows: 
Tk{C) = ckJ2vtk{C,i)B (6) 
Using the above equation, our Social Choice Function (SCF) can be denoted as: 
s(c) = ] [ > ]r vtk(c> *)B = E T^c) w 
keN ieN keN 
where the objective function is the sum of all players' valuations [63]. Here valuation 
refers to the total cost incurred by a node. According to [44], the strategy-proof payment 
for minimizing a function should have the following generalized form. 
Pk = Tk(C)-S(C) + hk(c-k) (8) 
where hk(c~k) is an arbitrary function of c~k. When ck = oo, the node is not elected due 
to no vote being received from its neighbors. Hence, its utility and payment will be zero. 
Thus, 




Pk = ck E vtk(C,i)B+ 
ieN 
E c i E vtj(C\ck = oo, i)B - E CJ E vtjiCii)B (10) 
jeN ieN jeN ieN 
= Yvtk{C,i)B{ck + = „ x 
i^M Z^ieN Vlk{^, ieN ^ieN ""fcV^i 0 
where, 
E ci E ^(Cl^ = °o» *) - E °i E vti(C' *)]} ( 1 ! ) 
jeiv ieiv jeiv ieN 
= Yvtk(C,i)Bpk (12) 
Pfc = Cfc + ^ ., X 
E CJ E •^(C'icfc = °°. o - E CJ E vti(c> *)i (13) 
This concludes the proof since the designed payment is in the generalized form of 
strategy-proof payment. • 
In the above proof, it can be noticed that excluding a node k from election will affect 
only the two-hop away nodes, since new leaders may need to be elected within the two-hop 
neighbors of node k. A detailed example is given in section 4.2. 
3.2.4 CDLE Payment Design 
In Cluster Dependent Leader Election (CDLE), the whole network is divided into a set 
of clusters where a set of one-hop neighbor nodes forms a cluster. Any cluster formation 
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algorithm [48] can be used to divide the network into clusters. Each cluster then indepen-
dently elects a leader node among them to handle the monitoring process based on the cost 
of analysis. Our objective is to find the most cost-efficient node that handles the detection 
process for the particular cluster. Hence our social choice function (Equation 1) can be 
simplified for a particular cluster in CDLE as follows: 
SCF(for CDLE) = min £ vk(9k, o(dk, 8_k)) (14) 
fc€n 
To achieve the desired goal, payments are computed using the VCG mechanism where 
truth-telling is proved to be dominant. Like CILE, our mechanism provides payment to the 
elected node and the payment is based on a per-packet price that depends on the number of 
votes the elected node gets. 
Theorem 2: Using the following design of payment, truth-telling is the dominant strat-
egy: 
Pk = ^2vtk(C,i)Bpk, where (15) 
ieTV 
pk = min Y^ VJ (ei» °(0j> °-J)) ( ! 6) 
je-nk 
Proof: According to the standard notation in mechanism design [63], the second best 
price is the simplest form of VCG mechanism. Here X) -e_nfc vA®v °(%> Q-j)) denotes the 
best price excluding nk. • 
51 
3.3 Security Analysis of the Mechanism 
The main objective of our mechanism is to motivate selfish nodes and enforce them to be-
have normally during and after the election process. Here, we analyze the election mecha-
nism in the presence of selfish and malicious nodes. 
3.3.1 Presence of Selfish Nodes 
A selfish node i will deviate from our mechanism if doing so increases its utility, «,. Here 
we consider two type of untruthful revelation, namely, node i might either under-declare 
or over-declare the true value Q of its cost of analysis. 
Node i may under-declare its valuation function with a fake value Ci(di < Q ) . By 
under-declaring, node i pretends that it has a cheaper valuation function than reality. Since 
payments are designed based on VCG, playing by under-declaration will not help the node 
for two reasons. First, suppose the node i indeed has the lowest cost of analysis c,, so it will 
win the election even by declaring its true value. In this case, reporting a lower value Q will 
not benefit the node because the payment is calculated based on the second best price and 
does not depend on the value declared by node i. Therefore, the utility of node i remains the 
same because it will be the difference between the payment and the real value Q. Second, 
suppose that the node i does not have the cheapest valuation function but tries to win the 
election by revealing a lower value c,. This will help the node i to win the election but it 
will also lead to a negative utility function Ui for node i, because the payment it receives 
will be less than the real cost of analysis. That is, the node i will have to work more than 
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what it has paid for. 
On the other hand, the node i might over-declare its valuation by revealing a fake Ci(di > 
Ci). Following such a strategy would never make a player happier in two cases. First, if the 
node i indeed has the cheapest valuation function, then following this strategy may prevent 
the node from being elected, and therefore it will lose the payment. On the other hand, 
if node i still wins, then its utility remains the same since the payment does not depend 
on the value it reports. Second, suppose the real valuation function Q of node i is not the 
lowest, then reporting a higher value will never help the node to win. Last but not least, 
the checkers are able to catch and punish the misbehaving leaders by mirroring a portion 
of its computation from time to time. A caught misbehaving leader will be punished by 
receiving a negative payment. Thus it discourages any elected node from not carrying out 
its responsibility. We can thus conclude that our mechanism is truthful and it guarantees a 
fair election of the most cost-efficient leader. 
3.3.2 Presence of Malicious Nodes 
A malicious node can disrupt our election algorithm by claiming a fake low cost in order to 
be elected as a leader. Once elected, the node does not provide IDS services, which eases 
the job of intruders. To catch and punish a misbehaving leader who does not serve others 
after being elected, we have proposed in [65] a decentralized catch-and-punish mechanism 
using random checker nodes to monitor the behavior of the leader. Although not repeated 
here, this scheme can certainly be applied here to thwart malicious nodes by catching and 
excluding them from the network. Due to the presence of checkers, a malicious node has 
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no incentive to become a leader since it will be caught and punished by the checkers. After 
a leader is caught misbehaving, it will be punished by receiving a negative reputation and 
is consequently excluded from future services of the cluster. Thus, our mechanism is still 
valid even in the presence of a malicious node. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented our leader election mechanism for truthfully electing the 
leader nodes. We formulated our model using the standard mechanism design notations. 
To achieve the design goal, we designed the cost of analysis function which is the private 
information of the nodes. To reveal the private information truthfully, we provided payment 
in the form of reputation. We described how this payment can be used to motivate nodes 
and to build a trusted environment. We also designed the payments for the two models 
which are strategy proof. Finally, we analyze our mechanism against selfish and malicious 




Leader Election Algorithms 
To run the election mechanism given in Chapter 4, we propose a leader-election algorithm 
that helps to elect the most cost-efficient leaders with less performance overhead compared 
to the network flooding model. We devise all the needed messages to establish the election 
mechanism taking into consideration cheating and presence of malicious nodes. Moreover, 
we consider the addition and removal of nodes to/from the network due to mobility reasons. 
Finally, the performance overhead is considered during the design of the given algorithm 
where computation, communication and storage overhead are derived. 
4.1 Objectives and Assumptions 
To design the leader election algorithm, the following requirements are needed: (1) To 
protect all the nodes in a network, every node should be monitored by a leader. (2) To 
balance the resource consumption of IDS service, the overall cost of analysis for protecting 
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the whole network is minimized. In other words, every node has to be affiliated with 
the most cost efficient leader among its neighbors. Our algorithm is executed in each 
node taking into consideration the following assumptions about the nodes and the network 
architecture: 
• Every node knows its (2-hop) neighbors, which is reasonable since nodes usually 
maintain a table about their neighbors for routing purposes. 
• Loosely synchronized clocks are available between nodes. 
• Each node has a key (public, private) pair for establishing a secure communication 
between nodes. 
• Each node is aware of the presence of a new node or removal of a node. 
For secure communication, we can use a combination of TESLA [66] and public key 
infrastructure. With the help of TESLA, loosely synchronized clocks can be available. 
Nodes can use public key infrastructure during election and TESLA in other cases. Recent 
investigations showed that computationally limited mobile nodes can also perform public 
key operations [32]. 
4.2 Leader Election 
To start a new election, the election algorithm uses four types of messages. Hello, used 
by every node to initiate the election process; Begin-Election, used to announce the cost 
of a node; Vote, sent by every node to elect a leader; Acknowledge, sent by the leader 
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to broadcast its payment, and also as a confirmation of its leadership. For describing the 
algorithm, we use the following notation: 
• service-table(k): The list of all ordinary nodes, those voted for the leader node k. 
• reputation-table(k): The reputation table of node k. Each node keeps the record of 
reputation of all other nodes. 
• neighbors (k): The set of node fc's neighbors. 
• leadernode(k): The ID of node fc's leader. If node k is running its own IDS then the 
variable contains k. 
• leader (k): A boolean variable that sets to TRUE if node A; is a leader. 
4.2.1 New Election 
Initially, each node k starts the election procedure by broadcasting a Hello message to all 
the nodes that are one hop from node k and starts a timer 7\. This message contains the 
hash value of the node's cost of analysis and its unique identifier (ID). This message is 
needed to avoid cheating where further analysis is conducted in Section 4.4.2. 
Algorithm 1 (Executed by every node) 
/* On receiving Hello, all nodes reply with their cost */ 
1. if (received Hello from all neighbors) then 
2. Send Begin-Election (IDk, cost)-)', 
3. else if (neighbor s(k)=0) then 
4. Launch IDS. 
5. end if 
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On expiration of Ti, each node k checks whether it has received all the hash values from 
its neighbors. Nodes from whom the Hello message have not received are excluded from 
the election. On receiving the Hello from all neighbors, each node sends Begin-Election as 
in Algorithm 1, which contains the cost of analysis of the node and then starts timer T2. If 
node k is the only node in the network or it does not have any neighbors then it launches 
its own IDS and terminates the algorithm. 
Algorithm 2 (Executed by every node) 
/* Each node votes for one node among the neighbors */ 
1. if (V n e neighbor(k) : Ci < cn) then 
2. send Vote(IDk, IDi,costj^i); 
3. leadernode(k)\= i; 
5. end if 
On expiration of T2, the node k compares the hash value of Hello to the value received 
by the Begin-Election to verify the cost of analysis for all the nodes. Then node k calculates 
the least-cost value among its neighbors and sends Vote for node i as in Algorithm 2. The 
Vote message contains the IDk of the source node, the IDi of the proposed leader and 
second least cost among the neighbors of the source node costj^. Then node k sets node 
i as its leader in order to update later on its reputation. Note that the second least cost of 
analysis is needed by the leader node to calculate the payment. If node k has the least cost 
among all its neighbors then it votes for itself and starts timer T3. 
On expiration of T3, the elected node i calculates its payment using equation 4 and 
sends an Acknowledge message to all the serving nodes as in Algorithm 3. The Acknowl-
edge message contains the payment and all the votes the leader received. The leader then 
launches its IDS. Each ordinary node verifies the payment and updates its reputation table 
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Algorithm 3 (Executed by Elected leader node) 
/* Send Acknowledge message to the neighbor nodes */ 
1. Leader(i) := TRUE; 
2. Compute Payment, Pf, 
j . upddteservice—faf)ie[^i), 
4. upd(iterepUfanon_fai)ie{ij, 
5. Acknowledge = Pj + all the votes; 
6. Send Acknowledge^); 
7. Launch IDS. 
according to the payment. All the messages are signed by the respective source nodes to 
avoid any kind of cheating. At the end of the election, nodes are divided into two types: 
Leader and ordinary nodes. Leader nodes run the IDS for inspecting packets, during an 
interval TELECT, based on the relative reputations of the ordinary nodes. We enforce re-
election every period TELECT since it is unfair and unsafe for one node to be a leader 
forever. Even if the topology remains same after TELECT time, all the nodes go back to 
initial stage and elect a new leader according to the above algorithms. 
Example: To illustrate the election scheme, Figure 9 shows a MANET with ten nodes. 
Since our model is repeatable, we present the election process at the V$h round. The 
reputation at the 9th round is given in the first row of Table 3. 
Table 3: Leader-IDS election example 
Nodes 
Reputation 9th 










































To elect a new leader in the 10 round, every node sends Hello and then a Begin-
Election message according to Algorithm 1. Nodes reveal their cost of analysis to the 
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Figure 9: A MANET after leader election 
mechanism based on their type {Selfish or Normal). The corresponding cost of analysis is 
given in the second row of Table 3. Then, node 7, 8, 9 and 10 vote for node 9 to be the 
leader as it has the least cost of analysis. Similarly, node 6 votes for node 5; node 3, 4 and 
5 vote for node 3; node 1 and 2 vote for node 1. After getting the vote, leader node 1, 3, 
5 and 9 will calculate their payment using equation 4. For node 9, the payment per packet 
ispg = 2 + | ( 8 x 1 + 4 x 3 — 2 x 4 ) = 5 because if node 9's cost is oo then node 10 
would have voted for node 6 and node 7, 8 and 9 would have voted for node 8. Hence the 
total cost would have been 20 instead of 8. Therefore, the total payment of node 9 is P9 = 
Y2 vgBpg = 4x5x5 = 100, where B= 5 packets/sec is the sampling budget. After election, 
leader Ng distributes the total IDS sampling budget over the protected nodes N7, N&, Ng 
and Nw, according to their reputation, as follows: S = {S7 = 5 g » , S8 = M^-, S9 = 
m^o^ sw =
 1 2 f ^ } . Similarly, the payment for elected leaders Nu N3 and N5 will be 
45, 95 and 40 respectively. Finally, the leader nodes will send Acknowledge message to all 
neighbors and run their IDS. Upon receiving the Acknowledge, all the neighboring nodes 
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increase the reputation of the elected leaders, as shown in the third row of Table 3. 
4.2.2 Adding New Nodes 
When a new node is added to the network, it either launches its own IDS or becomes 
an ordinary node of any leader node. To include a new node to the IDS service, four 
messages are needed: Hello, Status, Join and Acknowledge. Hello is sent by a new node n 
to announce its presence in the network. This Hello message is similar to the one presented 
in the previous section. Upon receiving the Hello, all the neighbors of the new node, reply 
with a Status message. If the neighbor node A; is a leader node, then the Status message 
contains its cost. On the other hand, if node k is an ordinary node, the Status message 
contains the ID of its leader node as in Algorithm 4. 
Algorithm 4 (Executed by neighboring nodes) 
/* The neighboring nodes send 'Status' to new node */ 
1. if (leader(k) = TRUE) then 
2. Status := Costk', 
3. else 
4. Status := leadernode(k); 
5. end if; 
6. send Status(k, n); 
On receiving the Status messages from the neighbors, the new node n sends Join to 
the leader node. If two of its neighbors are leaders with the same cost, then the new node 
can send Join to any of the nodes depending on its physical location (i.e; signal strength). 
We assume that an ordinary node have no interest to be a leader during the service time 
since it will not receive any payment from others. The algorithm does not make the new 
node as a leader for others before the new election (i.e., to reduce performance overhead). 
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Figure 10: A MANET after adding a new node 
Detailed analysis is presented in Section 4.4. If the new node has the least cost, it can either 
send Join to the leader node or launches its own IDS. After getting the Join message, the 
leader node adds the new node to its service list and divides its budget according to nodes' 
reputation. We do not give any new payment to the leader as the leader node has the same 
budget. A problem can arise from keeping the same sampling budget for every added node. 
It causes the voting nodes to have less IDS service compared to what they have payed for at 
the election time. Thus, less sampling is offered to the voting nodes, which will ease the job 
of an attacker. An attacker can take an advantage from this technique only if the network is 
static. On the other hand, in a dynamic network, which is the case of MANET, nodes are 
dynamically added and removed from the network due to mobility. As a result, the average 
value of the budget will remain the same. Thus, the security of nodes will not be effected. 
Finally, the leader node sends an Acknowledge message, that includes its payment, to the 
new node so that the new node can update its reputation table. 
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Example: Let us consider a new node that will be added to the network in Figure 9. The 
resulting network after adding the new node is shown in Figure 10. The new node 11 is 
connected with node 3, 5 and 6. The cost of node 11 is 6. Node 11 sends a Hello message 
to all its neighbors. All the nodes reply with the Status message. Node 11 sends Join to 
leader node 3 as it has the least cost. Finally, leader node 3 adds node 11 in its serving list. 
4.2.3 Removing Nodes 
When a node is disconnected from the network due to many reasons; such as, mobility or 
battery depletion, then the neighbor nodes have to reconfigure the network. 
Algorithm 5 (Executed by neighboring nodes) 
/* The neighboring nodes reconfigure the network and declare new */ 
/* election if necessary*/ 
1. if (leadernode(k) = n) then 
2. leadernode(k) :=NULL; 
4. send Begin — Election as in Algorithm 1; 
5. end if; 
6. if (leader (k) = TRUE) then 
7. if (n e service(k)) then 
o. Update serviceQi 
9. end if; 
10. end if; 
We assume that whenever a node dies, its neighbors are aware of it. At first a Dead(n) 
message is circulated to all neighbors to confirm the removal of node n. On receiving the 
Dead(n) message, the neighbor node k checks whether node n is its leader node or not. 
If node n is the leader node of node k, then node k announce a new election and updates 
its reputation table. On the other hand, if node n is an ordinary node then its leader node 
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updates its service-table. 
Figure 11: A MANET after adjustment 
Example: Here, we consider the removal either of an ordinary node or a leader node. 
Considering the network in Figure 9, let us assume that node 7 has left the network or died. 
Immediately, node 8 and 9 will be aware of the failure. On receiving the Dead(7) message, 
node 8 and 9 check whether node 7 is their leader or it's being served by them. As node 
7 is an ordinary node, node 8 does nothing. In case of node 9, it updates its serving list 
as in Algorithm 4. Assume now that the links of node 9 have been broken as shown in 
Figure 11. Then the neighboring nodes 7, 8 and 10 will discover that node 9 is their leader. 
Immediately, they will go for a new election, and node 8 will become the new leader. In 
the case of node 10, it will launch its own IDS since it has no neighboring leader node. It 
cannot even Join node 6, because node 6 is an ordinary node and it is served by node 5. It 
has to wait for the expiration ofTELECT for the new election. 
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4.3 Performance Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the performance overhead of our proposed leader algorithm. In 
summary, our algorithm has four steps. In the first 3 steps, all the nodes broadcast Hello, 
Begin-Election and Vote messages consecutively. In the last step, only the leader node 
sends an Acknowledge message to others. 
4.3.1 Computation Overhead 
Each node i signs its messages sent in the first 3 steps. Also, each node verifies the mes-
sages it received in these steps. In the 4th step, the leader node signs the Acknowledge mes-
sage and others verify. Hence each normal node signs 3 messages and verifies 3I-/V&I + 1 
messages where Ngt is the number of neighboring nodes. On the other hand, the leader 
node signs 4 messages and verifies 3|A^5j| messages. Note that each node must find the 
least cost node which requires 0(log(Ngi)). Therefore, each node approximately per-
forms 0(Ngi) verifications, 0(1) signatures and 0(log(Ngi)) to calculate the least cost 
node. Thus the computation overhead for each node is 0{Ngi) + 0(1) + 0(log(Ngi)) 
ft* 0{Ngt). Since our algorithm involves more verification than signing, nodes can use the 
public key cryptosystem of [32] to verify a signature in 0.43s. Since leader election will 
take place after a certain interval, this computational overhead is tolerable. 
65 
4.3.2 Communication Overhead 
Each node i broadcasts one message in the first 3 steps and only the leader node broadcasts 
a final Acknowledge message in the 4th step. Hence, the total communication overhead of 
our election algorithm is 3|iVj| + 1 « O(A^), where |JVj| is the number of nodes in the 
network. 
4.3.3 Storage Overhead 
According to the algorithm, each node maintains a reputation-table, neighbors list and two 
variables: Leadernode and leader (see section 4.2). The leader node keeps an extra service-
table. Hence, each normal node needs | JVj| + \Ng^ + 2 storage and the leader node needs 
|iVj| + \Ngt\ + \Vi\ + 2. Knowing that |iVj| is the number of nodes in the network, | Vi\ is the 
number of votes the leader node received where |A^| > {Ng^ > \Vi\. Therefore, the total 
storage for each node is in the order of O(iVj). 
For CDLE, the network has to be initially clustered. Hence there is an extra overhead 
for clustering. A comparison of different clustering algorithms is presented in [48]. 
4.4 Correctness and Security Properties of the Algorithm 
In this section, we discuss the correctness and security properties of our election algorithm. 
We prove that our algorithm satisfies the requirements and provides the necessary security 
properties for secure election. 
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4.4.1 Algorithmic Correctness 
Here, we prove that our algorithm achieves our objectives mentioned in section 4.1. 
Proposition 1: Our algorithm confirms that each node is monitored by a leader node. 
Proof: It is easily noticeable that after executing the election algorithm, each node is 
assigned a role. According to Algorithm 2, a nodes is either a leader or ordinary within a 
finite time. This can be proved from Algorithm 2. After receiving Hello and Begin-Election 
messages from all the neighbor nodes within (Ti + T2) time, nodes are sorted according to 
their cost of analysis. By executing Algorithm 2, each node sets its variable leadernode(k) 
to k if node k has the least cost of analysis. Nodes can not do anything but to send the 
Vote message to the deserving candidate. If a node does not have any neighbor, it becomes 
the leader node according to Algorithm 1. Besides, if a node loses its connection with the 
leader due to change in the network topology, it can always get associated with another 
leader through Algorithms 4 and 5. Thus, in all cases a node is either a leader or ordinary 
(monitored by a leader node). D 
Proposition 2: The overall cost of analysis for protecting the network is minimized. 
Proof: According to proposition 1, each node is assigned a role and the role is decided 
according to the cost of analysis. Each node sends a Vote message to the node which has 
the least cost of analysis. Thus, our election scheme minimizes the SCF function depicted 
in equation 1 through assigning each node to the most cost-efficient leader. Since each 
node can affect only two-hop away nodes, the locally optimal election results are sufficient 
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to yield the globally optimal result (that is, the minimized SCF function). One exception 
can occur when a node is added after the election and the new node has the minimum cost 
of analysis. We don't elect the new node as a leader since it will cause communication 
overhead (frequent leader change) in the network and could be used maliciously to disrupt 
the IDS service. The new node has to wait for the new election round after TELECT to 
participate in the election process. • 
4.4.2 Security Concerns 
Our proposed algorithm itself has to be secure along with its algorithmic correctness, which 
we believe it is hard to achieve especially in a distributed environment. In the following, 
we discuss some of the security properties of our algorithm. 
The algorithm provides basic security requirements. Since we assume the presence of 
TESLA and PKI protocols, all the messages are signed by the source node and verified by 
others. This provides the integrity of every message. Unauthorized nodes can not do any 
modification of the messages. The recipient nodes can verify the signature of the sender 
node. Since the private key belongs only to the sender node, thus source authentication is 
also achieved by protecting the message integrity. Besides, each message includes the time. 
Since loose synchronized clocks are available between the nodes, the recipient nodes can 
verify wheatear the message is reply or not. Thus our algorithm is also safeguarded against 
reply attack. 
The algorithm is cheat proof. We claim that our algorithm is cheat-proof because a 
node, which does not have the least cost of analysis among its neighbors cannot be elected 
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as a leader. To prevent a node from revealing its cost after observing others, we design 
our cost revaluation procedure in two rounds: First, each node computes the hash of its 
cost where all the nodes use the same hash function. Then, nodes broadcast the hash value 
using the Hello message. Second, upon receiving the hash values from all the nodes, each 
node reveals its cost of analysis. Since the hash values are already available, every node 
verifies the cost of analysis of the other nodes. In this way, we are able to prevent cheating 
by declining the revelation of the announced cost of analysis value or changing it later on. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we designed our election algorithm to implement our mechanism. The 
algorithm provides the details about how the nodes compute their payments and how they 
elect a set of leader node from the whole network. Besides, we also extended the solution 
to reconfigure the network in the case of addition or removal of nodes from the network. 
We calculated different overheads of our algorithm and showed that our algorithm is correct 
and meet our objectives. Finally we discussed different security properties of the algorithm. 




In this section, we evaluate the performance of our model with respect to random and 
connectivity models. We simulate the schemes using Network Simulator 2 (NS2) [56] and 
MATLAB. 
5.1 Performance Metrics 
The main objective of our simulation results is to study the effect of node selection for IDS 
on the life of all nodes. To show the negative impact of selfish node, we conducted two 
experiments: Time taken for the first node to die and percentage of packet analysis. Besides, 
we use the following metrics to evaluate our algorithm against others: Percentage of alive 
nodes, energy level of nodes, percentage of leader node, average cluster size, maximum 
cluster size and number of single node clusters. Our experiments have been conducted in 
both static and dynamic networks. For a static network, we compare our algorithm with 
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both random and connectivity models, while for dynamic network, we only compare with 
connectivity model since we believe that the random model will perform almost the same 
as in static one. Each point in the graph is the average result of 100 simulation run. 
5.2 Simulation Environment 
To implement the models, we modify the energy model to measure the effect of running 
IDS. Initially, we randomly assign 60 to 100 joules to each node. We assume that the 
energy required for running the IDS for one time slot as 10 joules. We ignore the energy 
required to live and transmit packets to capture the silent aspect of the problem. We set the 
transmission radius of each node to 200 meters. Two nodes are considered as neighbors if 
their Euclidean distance is less than or equal to 200 meters. 
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Besides, we deploy different number of nodes, which varies from 20 to 50 in an area of 
500 x 500 square meters. It helps us to measure the performance of the nodes from sparse 
networks to dense networks. Table 4 summarizes our simulation parameters. 
71 
5.3 Experiments 
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Figure 12: Effect of selfish nodes on the other nodes 
Nodes can behave selfishly before and after the election. A node shows selfishness 
before election by refusing to be a leader. On the other hand, selfishness after election 
is considered when nodes misbehave by not carrying out the detection service after being 
a leader. Both kinds of selfishness have a serious impact on the normal nodes. To show 
the seriousness and impact of selfishness before election on resource consumption, Figure 
12.(a) depicts the impact of selfish nodes on the life of normal nodes. The result indicates 
that the normal nodes will carry out more duty of intrusion detection and die faster when 
there are more selfish nodes. Figure 12.(b) shows the impact of selfishness after election 
on security. We consider the presence of 20% of selfish nodes out of 10 nodes. As selfish 
nodes do not exhaust energy to run the IDS service, it will live longer than the normal 
nodes. Thus, the more the time goes, the more the chances that the selfish node will be the 
leader node. Hence, the percentage of packet analysis decreases with time, which is shown 
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Figure 13: Percentage of alive nodes 
In Figure 13, we compare our model with the other two models to show the percentage 
of alive nodes with respect to time. We simulate our model in a network of 10 mobile 
nodes as shown in Figure 9 with the presence of 20% of selfish nodes. We consider nodes 
4 and 7 to be selfish and study their impact on our model, random and connectivity models 
with no mobility. The nodes repetitively elect a set of leaders every TELECT seconds. The 
election is based on the proposed scheme. The experiment indicates that our model results 
in a higher percentage of alive nodes, in contrast to other models. On the other hand, the 
random model elects leaders without considering the energy level and leads nodes with low 
energy to die fast. Finally, the connectivity model elects leaders based on their number of 
connections. In the case of static scenarios, the model elects the same node repeatedly, 
which causes the normal nodes to die very fast. In our model, the node that has the least 
cost of analysis becomes the leader. In this way, all the nodes can keep a balance of their 
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energy level with time. Hence, all the nodes will live long and die at the same time which 
is clearly shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 14: Energy level of the nodes 
Figure 14.(a) indicates that our model is able to balance the resource consumption 
among all nodes. On the other hand, the random (Figure 14.(b)) and connectivity (Fig-
ure 14.(c)) models result in unbalanced energy consumption and several dead nodes. 
Now, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm in a dynamic network for different 
number of nodes from 20 to 50. The simulation parameters are mentioned in Table 4. We 
compare our model only with the connectivity model since we believe that the expected 
performance of the random model will be close to the one given with low mobility (static 
network). Figure 15 shows that more nodes are alive in our model compared to the connec-
tivity one. As the number of nodes increases, the life of nodes also increases since there 
are more nodes to act as leaders. Thus, the detection service is distributed among the nodes 
which prolongs the live time of the nodes in MANET. 
Last but not least, we compare some of the cluster characteristics of our model with 
those of the connectivity model. Figure 16.(a) shows the percentage of the leader nodes. 
The percentage of leaders for our model is less as compared to those of the connectivity 
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Figure 15: Percentage of alive nodes in dynamic network 
model that saves the energy of nodes. Figure 16.(b) compares the average cluster size of 
both the models for different number of nodes. Our model has a higher average cluster size 
than the other one. This proves that our model is able to uniformly distribute the load of the 
leaders. Figure 16.(c) illustrates the size of the maximum cluster. The maximum cluster 
size for both models is increasing with the number of nodes. For our model, the maximum 
cluster size is less and thus avoid many problems; such as, message collisions, transmission 
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Figure 16: Comparison of cluster characteristics 
packets is analyzed per node compared to the other model. Moreover, our model is able 
to reduce the number of single node clusters as the density of nodes is increasing. This 
shown in Figure 16.(d). From these experiments, we can conclude that our model is able to 
balance the IDS resource consumption in the presence of selfish nodes. Moreover, it is able 
to reduce single node clusters and also the maximum cluster size. Besides, it achieves more 
uniform clusters with less leader nodes. Finally, these properties improve the efficiency of 
the IDS on detecting intrusions since the sampling budget is distributed over less number 
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of nodes compared to the other model. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we compared our model with the other two models. We simulated the 
models both in static and dynamic network for different number of nodes. At first, we 
showed the negative impact of selfish nodes on the network. Selfish nodes decrease the life 
time of other nodes and also increase the security vulnerabilities of the network. The other 
models ignore completely the presence of selfish nodes. 
We observed that our model can prolong the life time of the network and at the same 
time can balance the energy level of the nodes. Unlike other models, it prevents the nodes 
from dying faster. We also discovered some other advantages of our model. Our model 
reduces the number of leader nodes with uniform cluster size. Besides, it has less number 




The unbalanced resource consumption of IDSs in MANET and the presence of selfish 
nodes have motivated us to propose an integrated solution for prolonging the lifetime of 
mobile nodes and for preventing the emergence of selfish nodes. The solution motivated 
nodes to truthfully elect the most cost-efficient nodes that handle the detection duty on be-
half of others. Moreover, the sum of the elected leaders is globally optimal. To achieve 
this goal, incentives are given in the form of reputations to motivate nodes in revealing 
truthfully their costs of analysis. Reputations are computed using the well known VCG 
mechanism by which truth-telling is the dominant strategy. We also analyzed the perfor-
mance of the mechanisms in the presence of selfish and malicious nodes. To implement 
our mechanism, we devised an election algorithm with reasonable performance overheads. 
We also provided the algorithmic correctness and security properties of our algorithm. We 
addressed these issues into two applications: CILE and CDLE. The former does not re-
quire any pre-clustering whereas CDLE requires nodes to be clustered before running the 
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election mechanism. Simulation results showed that our model is able to prolong the life-
time and balance the overall resource consumptions among all the nodes in the network. 
Moreover, we are able to decrease the percentage of leaders, single node clusters, maxi-
mum cluster size and increase average cluster size. These properties allow us to improve 
the detection service through distributing the sampling budget more uniformly. 
6.1 List of Publications 
The following are the list of publications resulted from the thesis: 
• N. Mohammed, H. Otrok, L. Wang, M. Debbabi, and P. Bhattacharya. Mechanism 
Design-Based Secure Leader Election Model for Intrusion Detection in MANET. 
Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2008. 
• H. Otrok, N. Mohammed, L. Wang, M. Debbabi, and P. Bhattacharya. A Coopera-
tive Leader Election Mechanism for Intrusion Detection in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. 
Submitted to IEEE Communications Magazine. 
• H. Otrok, N. Mohammed, L. Wang, M. Debbabi, and P. Bhattacharya. A Game The-
oretic Intrusion Detection Model for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. Journal of Computer 
Communications, Special Issue onaAlgorithmic and Theoretical Aspects of Wireless 
Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2008, pages 708-721. 
• N. Mohammed, H. Otrok, L. Wang, M. Debbabi, and P. Bhattacharya. A Mechanism 
Design-Based Multi-Leader Election Scheme for Intrusion Detection in MANET. 
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Proceedings of IEEE Wireless Communications & Networking Conference (WCNC), 
Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, March 2008. 
• H. Otrok, N. Mohammed, L. Wang, M. Debbabi, and P. Bhattacharya. An Efficient 
and Truthful Leader IDS Election Mechanism for MANET. Proceedings of IEEE 
International conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Com-
munications (WiMob), New York, USA, October 2007. 
6.2 Future Work 
Our current model can reduce the overall resource consumption of IDSs in a network but 
this model is suitable when the probability of attack is low. As a future work, we are 
planning to consider the tradeoffs between security and IDS resources consumption through 
adding more leaders to the network once the risk of attack is high. Thus, present model can 
be considered as moderate intrusion detection systems since a portion of the nodes' packets 
are monitored and analyzed. Leaders should be added optimally to the network according 
to the security. Hence, an optimal strategy needs to be formulated to dynamically adjust the 
number of IDS nodes according to the resource constraints and potential threats. Besides, 
we proposed an abstract model of the reputation system. Further investigation is needed to 
ensure the security of the proposed reputation system. 
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